本书是最近十余年来欧美经济学界最具影响力的高级微观经济学教科书。原著（Microeconomic Theory）由牛津大学出版社出版以来，受到了经济学界的广泛关注和好评。全书系统全面地介绍了高级微观经济理论的各个方面，涉及的论题丰富、信息量大，是公认的微观经济理论的“圣经”；本书被国外几乎所有的一流大学采用，是经济学专业研究生的必读书籍。
本书逻辑脉络清晰、写作风格严谨、分析方法精湛，以空前的深度和广度阐述了微观经济学所有重要的论题，不仅对经典理论进行了充分论述，而且对最新理论也给予了深入的分析，并展示了一些前沿论题的研究现状和发展趋势。
本书内容包括个体决策、博弈论、市场均衡与市场失灵、一般均衡、福利经济学与激励等五大部分。第一部分从对个人行为的一般分析出发，相对完整地介绍了经典的消费者和生产者理论，并介绍了不确定情况下的个人选择。第二部分是博弈论，阐述了静态博弈与动态博弈的各种解概念与分析方法，分析了行为相互影响下的个人决策。第三部分是市场均衡和市场失灵，详细介绍了外部性与公共物品、市场垄断、逆向选择以及委托代理等信息经济学的基本模型。第四部分关于一般均衡理论，介绍与一般均衡相关的各种概念，包括均衡的存在性和稳定性及福利特征等。第五部分涉及福利经济学与激励问题，分析在个人效用可比和不可比情况下，由个人偏好加总为社会偏好的可能性，以及在关于个人偏好的信息不完全时的社会选择和经济机制设计等规范分析问题。本书的数学附录为读者提供了所需的基本数学知识。书中每一章都提供必要的详细参考文献，方便学生进一步学习及寻找研究课题；同时，各章配备的层次不同的练习题，非常有利于学生测试自己对各章内容的掌握程度。
本书作者安德鲁·马斯-科莱尔、迈克尔·D·温斯顿、杰里·R·格林三位教授长期在美国哈佛大学及其他世界名校从事研究生层面的微观经济学课程的教学工作，且在各自的研究领域多有建树。此书是他们多年教学和合作的成果。

In these notes, Professor Kreps surveys the standard models of choice under uncertainty that lie at the heart of microeconomic theory. Choice and preference, ordinal utility, von Neumann-Morganstern utility and utility functions for money, and subjective probability and subjective expected utility are among the standard topics covered. These notes provide a rigorous but accessible introduction to the theory of choice for mathematically inclined undergraduates and/or graduate students in economics, finance, and related disciplines.

What is the best way to auction an asset? How should a group of people organize themselves to ensure the best provision of public goods? How should exchanges be organized? In An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design, Tilman Börgers addresses these questions and more through an exploration of the economic theory of mechanism design. Mechanism design is reverse game theory. Whereas game theory takes the rules of the game as a given and makes predictions about the behavior of strategic players, the theory of mechanism design goes a step further and selects the optimal rules of the game.
A relatively new economic theory, mechanism design studies the instrument itself as well as the results of the instrument. An Introduction to the Theory of Mechanism Design provides rigorous but accessible explanations of classic results in the theory of mechanism design, such as Myerson's theorem on expected revenue maximizing auctions, Myerson and Satterthwaite's theorem on the impossibility of ex post efficient bilateral trade with asymmetric information, and Gibbard and Satterthwaite's theorem on the non-existence of dominant strategy voting mechanisms. Börgers also provides an examination of the frontiers of current research in the area with an original and unified perspective that will appeal to advanced students of economics.
"Tilman Borgers offers the first book-length introduction into the theory of mechanism design. Written in a very personal and masterful style, he carefully covers the main developments in theory of mechanism design-the theory of how to choose the rules of the game-over the past decades. It will be an ideal textbook for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses for many years to come."
Dirk Bergemann, Douglass and Marion Campbell Professor of Economics and Chair, Yale University
"Tilman Borgers gives a beautifully lucid and elegant development of mechanism design in this wonderful book. His masterful exposition provides a unified and cohesive treatment of modern mechanism design, starting from first principles and working through topics at the leading edge of the research frontier. This book is a delight and an invaluable resource for those new to the field and experts alike."
Chris Shannon, Richard and Lisa Steiny Professor of Economics and Professor of Mathematics, University of California, Berkeley
"This book provides an integrated treatment of the theory of mechanism design by a leading practitioner in this area. It covers the core theory together with chapters on recent developments in robust mechanism design and dynamic mechanism design. The core theory is built up in an original and pedagogically successful way, starting with screening in chapter 2 and immediately using those tools to develop leading applications of Bayesian mechanism design-auctions, bilateral trade, and public goods-in chapter 3. These results can then naturally be adapted to dominant strategies in chapter 4. Chapters 5, 6, and 7 then deal with the general theories of incentive compatibility, Bayesian mechanism design, and dominant strategy mechanism design.
The first seven chapters of the book focus on the quasi-linear environments studied in most economic applications, with more general environments ('non-transferable utility') postponed to chapter 8. This ordering of material reflects not the historical development of the subject but a natural and effective path to learn the material. Borgers develops a unified treatment of core material without attempting to be exhaustive. Valuable endnotes at the end of each chapter then explain the historical context and relation to the literature more broadly. It will serve as an excellent textbook for graduate students and advanced undergraduates, and an invaluable reference for researchers."
Stephen Morris, Professor of Economics, Princeton University

This book introduces one of the most powerful tools of modern economics to a wide audience: those who will later construct or consume game-theoretic models. Robert Gibbons addresses scholars in applied fields within economics who want a serious and thorough discussion of game theory but who may have found other works overly abstract. Gibbons emphasizes the economic applications of the theory at least as much as the pure theory itself; formal arguments about abstract games play a minor role. The applications illustrate the process of model building--of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal game-theoretic problem to be analyzed. Also, the variety of applications shows that similar issues arise in different areas of economics, and that the same game-theoretic tools can be applied in each setting. In order to emphasize the broad potential scope of the theory, conventional applications from industrial organization have been largely replaced by applications from labor, macro, and other applied fields in economics. The book covers four classes of games, and four corresponding notions of equilibrium: static games of complete information and Nash equilibrium, dynamic games of complete information and subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium, static games of incomplete information and Bayesian Nash equilibrium, and dynamic games of incomplete information and perfect Bayesian equilibrium.