This is the classic work upon which modern-day game theory is based. What began more than sixty years ago as a modest proposal that a mathematician and an economist write a short paper together blossomed, in 1944, when Princeton University Press published
. In it, John von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern conceived a groundbreaking mathematical theory of economic and social organization, based on a theory of games of strategy. Not only would this revolutionize economics, but the entirely new field of scientific inquiry it yielded--game theory--has since been widely used to analyze a host of real-world phenomena from arms races to optimal policy choices of presidential candidates, from vaccination policy to major league baseball salary negotiations. And it is today established throughout both the social sciences and a wide range of other sciences.
This sixtieth anniversary edition includes not only the original text but also an introduction by Harold Kuhn, an afterword by Ariel Rubinstein, and reviews and articles on the book that appeared at the time of its original publication in the
, tthe
, and a variety of other publications. Together, these writings provide readers a matchless opportunity to more fully appreciate a work whose influence will yet resound for generations to come.

简体中文，社科文献，110RMB
2001年3月

Product Description
Eminently suited to classroom use as well as individual study, Roger Myerson's introductory text provides a clear and thorough examination of the models, solution concepts, results, and methodological principles of noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Myerson introduces, clarifies, and synthesizes the extraordinary advances made in the subject over the past fifteen years, presents an overview of decision theory, and comprehensively reviews the development of the fundamental models: games in extensive form and strategic form, and Bayesian games with incomplete information.
Game Theory will be useful for students at the graduate level in economics, political science, operations research, and applied mathematics. Everyone who uses game theory in research will find this book essential.

《身边的博弈》用浅显易懂的语言、近百个故事讲述了博弈论的基本原理及其在现实世界的运用，使你通过快乐地学习生活中无时不在的博弈掌握竞争的技巧。

《自然正义》运用博弈论研究道德，做了大胆的尝试，为道德作为一门真正的科学奠定了基础。因为人类的道德如同人类的其他特性一样，是通过演化产生的，《自然正义》的观点认为，我们需要探究我们前人类祖先在食物共享中的社会契约的起源。《自然正义》主张，我们目前的公平规范的深层结构继续反映了原始社会契约的逻辑，然而，某个社会特定的公平规范的执行主要是文化演化的结果。依据该观点，《自然正义》对于罗尔斯原初状态提出了自然主义角度的重新阐释，通过确定具体的应用环境，将关于正义的罗尔斯的平等主义理论与海萨尼的功利主义理论调和起来。

本书是高级经济学教科书，也是博弈论入门书。其长处在于避免了为研究博弈论而研究博弈论，把重点放在了博弈论在经济学的应用上，因此非常适合于经济学专业人士阅读。

耶鲁大学教授奈尔伯夫和普林斯顿大学教授迪克西特的这本着作，用许多活生生的例子，向没有经济学基础的读者展示了博弈论策略思维的道理。试看一例：　　奈尔伯夫大学毕业的时候，在剑桥大学的正式舞会上参加轮盘赌游戏并且以700:300的大比数领先。眼看大奖在望，鬼使神差他却无视已经具有的后动优势，在最后一轮大意先行，结果功败垂成。事后他回忆那天酒喝多了，忘记了博弈论的教导：领先的时候要采取让对手先行的保守策略。这位博弈论的高才生，就这样输在原来处于第二位并且曾经求和建议分享奖励的女士手下（参见本书第1章）。　　人生是一个永不停息的决策过程。从事什么样的工作，怎样打理一宗生意，该和谁结婚，怎样将孩子抚养成人，要不要竞争总裁的位置，都是这类决策的例子。你不是在一个真空的世界里做决定。相反，你身边全是和你一样的决策制定者。虽然冲突的成分很多，但是合作的因素也不少。本书将帮助你学会策略地思考，在人生博弈中扩大胜面。　　本书以讲故事取胜。它的学术根源，是迪克西特教授在普林斯顿大学公共与国际事务学院开设的“策略博弈”课程。简而言之，这是关于了解对手打算如何战胜你，然后你战而胜之的艺术。怎样打赢一场网球，少数如何战胜多数，为什么要“喜爱”你最讨厌的对手等等，都在讨论之列。　　这是一门新兴的策略科学，由一些简单的基本原理组成。不同背景和行业的读者掌握了这些原理，运筹帷幄取得胜利的本领就会上升一个层

《合作的进化》(修订版)是行为领域的经典之作，主题是合作的产生和进化。作者以组织的两轮“重复囚徒困境”竞赛为研究对象，结果发现在两轮竞赛中胜出的都是最简单的策略“一报还一报”。这一策略简洁明晰，具有善良性、宽容性、可激怒性和策略性，其出色的竞赛表现为我们了解个人、组织和国家间合作产生和进化提供了积极的前景。

这部经典著作是现代博弈论的基石。两位作者根据策略博弈理论构思了一个经济和社会组织的开创性数学理论。这不仅彻底改变了经济学，而且产生了博弈论这一全新的科研领域。博弈论自那以后被广泛用于分析军备竞赛、总统候选人、疫苗接种政策以及职业棒球大联盟工资谈判等一系列现实现象。本书的60周年版不仅包括原文，还包括 Harold William Kuhn 的序言、Ariel Rubinstein 的后记以及在《纽约时报》、《美国经济评论》和其他出版物上关于这本书初版的评论，让读者更充分地欣赏这本影响深远的作品。

尽管《博弈论》对于那些已经对博弃论有所了解，希望学习更多的博奕论知识而不用上一门正式课程的研究者有用，或是作为一本参考书和部分文献的导读，但它基本的任务还是作为一本博养论课程的教材。我们集中于介绍概念和一般性的结论，更多地使用“简化的例子”而不是具体的应用，而那些被我们选择使用的应用则是用来显示理论的力量的；我们没有对任何具体领域内的应用给出全面的叙述。绝大多数的应用来自于经济学的文献，我们希望我们的读者将来能够成为经济学家。不过，我们也包括进了一些来自政治科学的例子，因此《博弈论》可能也对政治科学家有用。

纳什博弈论论文集，ISBN：9787563806683，作者：（美）约翰·纳什（John Nash，Jr）著；张良桥，王晓刚译；张良桥译

Millions have seen the movie and thousands have read the book but few have fully appreciated the mathematics developed by John Nash's beautiful mind. Today Nash's beautiful math has become a universal language for research in the social sciences and has infiltrated the realms of evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and even quantum physics. John Nash won the 1994 Nobel Prize in economics for pioneering research published in the 1950s on a new branch of mathematics known as game theory. At the time of Nash's early work, game theory was briefly popular among some mathematicians and Cold War analysts. But it remained obscure until the 1970s when evolutionary biologists began applying it to their work. In the 1980s economists began to embrace game theory. Since then it has found an ever expanding repertoire of applications among a wide range of scientific disciplines. Today neuroscientists peer into game players' brains, anthropologists play games with people from primitive cultures, biologists use games to explain the evolution of human language, and mathematicians exploit games to better understand social networks. A common thread connecting much of this research is its relevance to the ancient quest for a science of human social behavior, or "a Code of Nature," in the spirit of the fictional science of psychohistory described in the famous Foundation novels by the late Isaac Asimov. In A Beautiful Math, acclaimed science writer Tom Siegfried describes how game theory links the life sciences, social sciences, and physical sciences in a way that may bring Asimov's dream closer to reality.

Game theory has revolutionized economics research and teaching during the past two decades. There are few undergraduate or graduate courses in which it does not form a core component. Game theory is the study of multi-decision problems and such problems occur frequently in economics. Industrial organization provides many examples where firms must consider the reactions of others. But there are many other areas in which it is applicable - from individual workers vying for promotion to countries competing or colluding to choose trade policies. Bob Gibbons provides an introduction to the branches of game theory that have been widely applied in economics. He emphasizes the applications as much as the pure theory. This not only helps to teach the theory, but also illustrates the process of model building - the process of translating an informal description of a multi-person decision situation into a formal, game theoretic problem to be analyzed. The approach aims to serve as both an introduction to those who will go on to specialize as pure game-theorists. It also introduces game theory to those who will later construct (or at least use) game-theoretic models in applied fields of economics.

This advanced text introduces the principles of noncooperative game theory - including strategic form games, Nash equilibria, subgame perfection, repeated games, and games of incomplete information - in a direct and uncomplicated style that will acquaint students with the broad spectrum of the field while highlighting and explaining what they need to know at any given point. The analytic material is accompanied by many applications, examples, and exercises.The theory of noncooperative games studies the behavior of agents in any situation where each agent's optimal choice may depend on a forecast of the opponents' choices. "Noncooperative" refers to choices that are based on the participant's perceived selfinterest. Although game theory has been applied to many fields, Fudenberg and Tirole focus on the kinds of game theory that have been most useful in the study of economic problems. They also include some applications to political science. The fourteen chapters are grouped in parts that cover static games of complete information, dynamic games of complete information, static games of incomplete information, dynamic games of incomplete information, and advanced topics.Drew Fudenberg and Jean Tirole are Professors of Economics at MIT.

Governments and institutions, perhaps even more than markets, determine who gets what in our society. They make the crucial choices about who pays the taxes, who gets into college, who gets medical care, who gets drafted, where the hazardous waste dump is sited, and how much we pay for public services. Debate about these issues inevitably centers on the question of whether the solution is "fair." In this book, H. Peyton Young offers a systematic explanation of what we mean by fairness in distributing public resources and burdens, and applies the theory to actual cases.

This volume brings together all of Ken Binmore's influential experimental papers on bargaining along with newly written commentary in which Binmore discusses the underlying game theory and addresses the criticism leveled at it by behavioral economists.When Binmore began his experimental work in the 1980s, conventional wisdom held that game theory would not work in the laboratory, but Binmore and other pioneers established that game theory can often predict the behavior of experienced players very well in favorable laboratory settings. The case of human bargaining behavior is particularly challenging for game theory. Everyone agrees that human behavior in real-life bargaining situations is governed at least partly by considerations of fairness, but what happens in a laboratory when such fairness considerations supposedly conflict with game-theoretic predictions? Behavioral economists, who emphasize the importance of other-regarding or social preferences, sometimes argue that their findings threaten traditional game theory. Binmore disputes both their interpretations of their findings and their claims about what game theorists think it reasonable to predict.Binmore's findings from two decades of game theory experiments have made a lasting contribution to economics. These papers--some coauthored with other leading economists, including Larry Samuelson, Avner Shaked, and John Sutton--show that game theory does indeed work in favorable laboratory environments, even in the challenging case of bargaining.Does Game Theory Work? The Bargaining Challenge, Volume 2

Learn to use probability in complex realistic situations with PROBABILITY MODELS FOR ECONOMIC DECISIONS. This introduction to the use of probability models for analyzing risks and economic decisions uses Microsoft Excel spreadsheets for the analytic work. As a result of the emphasis on spreadsheet modeling, you'll also develop sophisticated spreadsheet skills.