“人类理解论”(An Essay concerning Human Understanding)一书是英国著名哲学家、唯物主义者约翰·洛克(John Locke，1632—1704)的主要哲学著作。这部书从1671年写起，直到1687年才完成，在1690年出版。“人类理解论”这一著作在西方哲学史上曾经发生过承前启后的作用，洛克作为唯物主义路线上的一个哲学家是西方唯物主义发展史上的一个重要环节。
洛克在这部著作中所提出并要解决的中心问题是关于人类知识的起源，可靠性和范围。本书一开头他首先批判了笛卡尔主张知识起源上的所谓“天赋观念”以及莱布尼兹的所谓“天赋实践原则”这样一个在认识论上的唯心主义观点，并且从而提出了他的那个有名的白板论，即认识的唯一来源是经验这样一个有巨大意义的唯物主义论点。不过，洛克在经验论上的唯物主义是不彻底的，正如他的政治观点、阶级立场是妥协的一样。所以他的哲学观点不仅影响了后来的唯物主义者(特别是法国百科全书派的启蒙思想家)，同时也被唯心主义者(特别是贝克莱和休谟)有隙可乘地加以利用和歪曲。
本书的汉文译本早由本馆出版过，现在经原译者对照原文重加修改、校订，交由本馆出版。

金岳霖是中国哲学知识沦研究领域的开拓者。《知识论》围绕“以经验之所得还治经验”这一主旨，自觉地将逻辑分析方法严格而系统地运用于哲学研究，特别注重思想的清晰性和论证性，系统地论述了知识的来源、知识的形成以及知识的可靠性、衡量真假的标准等问题。弥补了中国知识论不发达的缺陷，改变了中国传统哲学文本的写作模式。

How must our knowledge be systematically organized in order to justify our beliefs? There are two options--the solid securing of the ancient foundationalist pyramid or the risky adventure of the new coherentist raft. For the foundationalist like Descartes each piece of knowledge can be stacked to build a pyramid. Not so, argues Laurence BonJour. What looks like a pyramid is in fact a dead end, a blind alley. Better by far to choose the raft.
Here BonJour sets out the most extensive antifoundationalist argument yet developed. The first part of the book offers a systematic exposition of foundationalist views and formulates a general argument to show that no variety of foundationalism provides an acceptable account of empirical justification. In the second part he explores a coherence theory of empirical knowledge and argues that a defensible theory must incorporate an adequate conception of observation. The book concludes with an account of the correspondence theory of empirical truth and an argument that systems of empirical belief which satisfy the coherentist standard of justification are also likely to be true.

The first edition of this book profoundly challenged and divided students of philosophy, sociology, and the history of science when it was published in 1976. In this second edition, Bloor responds in a substantial new Afterword to the heated debates engendered by his book. "Bloor's book came out as a broadside that announced a new approach to the history and philosophy of science, an approach that became known as the strong programme.' . . . Now, any book published in history and philosophy of science must take Bloor and the strong programme into account."--Robert J. Richards, University of Chicago

Western philosophers have traditionally concentrated on theory as the means for expressing knowledge about a variety of phenomena. This absorbing book challenges this fundamental notion by showing how objects themselves, specifically scientific instruments, can express knowledge. As he considers numerous intriguing examples, Davis Baird gives us the tools to "read" the material products of science and technology and to understand their place in culture. Making a provocative and original challenge to our conception of knowledge itself, "Thing Knowledge" demands that we take a new look at theories of science and technology, knowledge, progress, and change. Baird considers a wide range of instruments, including Faraday's first electric motor, eighteenth-century mechanical models of the solar system, the cyclotron, various instruments developed by analytical chemists between 1930 and 1960, spectrometers, and more.

"The Uncertainties of Knowledge" extends Immanuel Wallerstein's decade-long work of elucidating the crisis of knowledge in current intellectual thought. He argues that the disciplinary divisions of academia have trapped us in a paradigm that assumes knowledge is a certainty and that it can help us explain the social world. This is wrong, he suggests. Instead, Wallerstein offers a new conception of the social sciences, one whose methodology allows for uncertainties. Author note: Immanuel Wallerstein is Director of the Fernand Braudel Center, Binghamton University, and Senior Research Scholar at Yale University.

Uncertainty is a fundamental and unavoidable feature of daily life; in order to deal with uncertaintly intelligently, we need to be able to represent it and reason about it. In this book, Joseph Halpern examines formal ways of representing uncertainty and considers various logics for reasoning about it. While the ideas presented are formalized in terms of definitions and theorems, the emphasis is on the philosophy of representing and reasoning about uncertainty; the material is accessible and relevant to researchers and students in many fields, including computer science, artificial intelligence, economics (particularly game theory), mathematics, philosophy, and statistics.Halpern begins by surveying possible formal systems for representing uncertainty, including probability measures, possibility measures, and plausibility measures. He considers the updating of beliefs based on changing information and the relation to Bayes' theorem; this leads to a discussion of qualitative, quantitative, and plausibilistic Bayesian networks. He considers not only the uncertainty of a single agent but also uncertainty in a multi-agent framework. Halpern then considers the formal logical systems for reasoning about uncertainty. He discusses knowledge and belief; default reasoning and the semantics of default; reasoning about counterfactuals, and combining probability and counterfactuals; belief revision; first-order modal logic; and statistics and beliefs. He includes a series of exercises at the end of each chapter.