In this title, two renowned political scientists make the contrarian, research-based case that - regardless of any other factors political scientists or historians may find relevant - the calculations and actions of rulers are the driving force of all politics, and the primary goal of rulers is to maintain power as long as possible. In this clever and accessible book, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith introduce us to their perspective of the political world. They bare the logic of politics, starting from the simple premise that leaders pursue their own ends, and that populations either have, or more often don't have, the power to constrain them to a significant degree. The book is organized by a series interconnected questions, among them: Why do leaders who wreck their countries keep their jobs for so long? Why do autocracies have dismal economic policies? How are there so many suffering people in resource-rich lands? Why do 'natural disasters' disproportionately strike poor nations? Why do 'evil-doers' so often collect loads of foreign aid? Why are democracies so good at war? In answering these questions, the authors look at politics, the choices of public policies, and even decisions about war and peace as lying outside of conventional thinking about culture and history. They set aside ideas of civic virtue and psychopathology. Such notions simply are not central to understanding what leaders do and why they do it. Instead, Bueno de Mesquita and Smith see politicians as self-interested louts, just the sort of people you wouldn't want to have over for dinner, but without whom you might not have dinner at all. And from this perspective, they are able to answer some perplexing mysteries of politics, shed light on what we read in the newspapers every single day, and offer realistic ways of improving human governance.

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

The authors of this ambitious book address a fundamental political question: why are leaders who produce peace and prosperity turned out of office while those who preside over corruption, war, and misery endure? Considering this political puzzle, they also answer the related economic question of why some countries experience successful economic development and others do not.The authors construct a provocative theory on the selection of leaders and present specific formal models from which their central claims can be deduced. They show how political leaders allocate resources and how institutions for selecting leaders create incentives for leaders to pursue good and bad public policy. They also extend the model to explain the consequences of war on political survival. Throughout the book, they provide illustrations from history, ranging from ancient Sparta to Vichy France, and test the model against statistics gathered from cross-national data. The authors explain the political intuition underlying their theory in nontechnical language, reserving formal proofs for chapter appendixes. They conclude by presenting policy prescriptions based on what has been demonstrated theoretically and empirically.

In this book, two renowned political scientists show how the rules of politics almost always favour leaders who ignore the national interest and focus on serving their own supporters. For eighteen years, political scientists Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith have been part of a team turning the conventional wisdom of politics on its head. In "The Dictator's Handbook" they reveal their simple, crucial conclusion: leaders will do whatever it takes to stay in power. Simple as it may sound, this perspective uncovers surprising insights, lays bare the logic of politics, and explains nearly everything we need to know about how countries and corporations are run. Examining the successes and failures of autocrats, democrats, and CEOs alike, "The Dictator's Handbook" paints an incomparable and profoundly necessary portrait of how politics - and leadership itself - really works Brilliant publicity for the hardcover: "The Wall Street Journal" called it "lucidly written, shrewdly argued," and "reminiscent of Freakonomics," and the "Financial Times" found it "illuminating and reader-friendly." Long-term academic appeal: Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is beloved by international relations and political science academics, and this is the most successful distillation of his ideas to date.

　　＃5個任何政治制度下都得以成功的法則
　　＃13種奪權的方法
　　＃6個讓你永遠不會下台的建議
　　＃3大政治群體
 
　　本書揭露了世界各地統治者權力法則運作的真相：
　　不管表面上提出再多「國家價值、社會利益、理念與願景」，
　　其背後的意圖永遠是延續自己的統治生涯，
　　而我們可以如何利用統治者的意圖，
　　改善國家的政治制度或公司的治理。
 
　　不管是民主政體、企業、慈善組織還是獨裁國家的領導人，只有一個共通的特質：他們想要延續自己的統治。
 
　　本書從這個基礎論點出發，大膽提出全新的單一架構理論，把我們所知的一切政治現實全部解構。那就是：國家沒有所謂的利益，人類才有。不管是非洲的獨裁國家還是亞洲的模範民主，領導者個人的利益與行動，永遠是驅動一切政治行為的力量。不管表面上提出再多「國家價值、社會利益、理念與願景」，背後的意圖永遠是延續自己的統治生涯。
 
　　接著，作者提出了一套極為簡單的方法，可以供任何想要長久統治的人參考並照著辦。包括
　　・創造權力的三個基本群體：廣大人民、重要成員、關鍵核心群
　　・關鍵核心群的人數越少越好
　　・切忌讓任何支持者擁有不可取代的地位
　　・找到利益、控制利益、分配利益
　　・絕對不要把利益從支持者手上拿開
 
　　只要理解政治運作的基本道理，我們就可以真正解讀每天在我們身旁發生的政治議題，包含「為什麼公司虧錢但高層享高薪」、「為什麼政客瘋狂舉債」、「為什麼立委選舉要採用小選區制度」、「為什麼財稅法規永遠是國會攻防的熱點」、「為什麼要尋求年輕選民的支持」、「為什麼要提出歡迎移民的政策」、「為什麼要一直擴張社會福利制度」，以及「為什麼一方面要為人民謀福，一方面又誓死反對敵對陣營的好倡議」等。
 
　　本書大量引用讀者容易理解的歷史事實與社會現況為例證。最重要的是，書中提出了具體的建議，針對如何改革民主制度、如何改革公司治理、如何擴大民意基礎等等議題，使我們更容易改變成真。

名人推薦

　　汪浩／牛津大學國際關係學博士
　　沈清楷／輔仁大學哲學系副教授        
　　胡忠信／歷史學者、電視、廣播主持人
　　陳方隅／菜市場政治學共同編輯
　　陳建守／「說書 Speaking of Books」創辦人
　　黃哲斌／新聞工作者
　　葉浩／政治大學政治系副教授
　　各界推薦
　　（按姓氏筆畫）
 
　　★這本書完美闡述了「民主制度的不完美」。沒有閱讀門檻、內容深具啟發性。—金融時報

　　★每位公民必讀！史上最佳政治主題書籍！—百萬觀看起跳政治主題網紅CGP Grey

　　★作者寫得非常清晰，論點非常聰明，而且旁徵博引，從經濟、企業、歷史、政治科學等領域引出大量例證。現實生活裡，幾乎找不到反證來駁倒作者提出的案例。—華爾街日報

　　★下次再有領導者宣稱自己「站在為了國家好的立場」在講話，請把「國家」兩個字用以下取代：「繼續執政」。—英國獨立報

　　★可以挑戰馬基維利《君王論》經典地位的新書出現了！這本書好棒，可以刺激我們思考。閱讀的時候，我發現我不但是「認同」書中看法，甚至是「被說服」了。—Enlightenment Economics.

　　★凱撒大帝、惠普公司、民粹集團、美式足球綠灣包裝隊…書中這些例子讓我們漸漸瞭解法治、國家治理、民主的原則。美國開國先聖一定會愛死這本書。—R. James Woolsey，美國國家情報總監

　　★本書讓我們對於政治系統有了更深入的瞭解。—Roger Myerson, 芝加哥大學經濟系榮譽教授

为什么同样一个人可以在一个国家推行善政却在另一个国家施行最残暴的独裁？在这里，与其说制度是答案还不如说是问题本身。为什么比利时的制度越来越民主，而同一时期，同一领导人的刚果，却越来越独裁？难道是因为利奥波德二世只爱本国人或者有种族歧视？但后来刚果自己“选”出来的领导人并没有做得更好，仍然是一个糟糕的独裁者。
在《独裁者手册》这本书里，梅斯奎塔和史密斯研究多年，得出了一个能够相当完美地解释这一政治现象的理论，即：不管是国家、公司还是国际组织，其政治格局不能简单地以“民主”和“独裁”来划分，而必须用民意选民、实际选民、胜利联盟的数字多少来描写。如果胜利联盟的人数很多，那么这个国家就是我们通常所说的民主国家。反过来，如果胜利联盟的人数非常少，那么不管这个国家有没有选举，都是事实上的非民主国家。据此，很容易明白：在刚果，利奥波德二世只需要让少数人高兴就足以维持自己的统治；而在比利时，他必须让很多人满意才行。
不得不提，对任何想理解政治的真正运作方式的人来说，《独裁者手册》都是一本必读的书，无论是政治领域的政治还是商业界的政治，无论是在独裁国家还是在民主国家。

For eighteen years, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith have been part of a team revolutionizing the study of politics by turning conventional wisdom on its head. They start from a single assertion: Leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don’t care about the “national interest”—or even their subjects—unless they have to. This clever and accessible book shows that the difference between tyrants and democrats is just a convenient fiction. Governments do not differ in kind but only in the number of essential supporters, or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with, and the quality of life or misery under them. The picture the authors paint is not pretty. But it just may be the truth, which is a good starting point for anyone seeking to improve human governance.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita is a master of game theory, which is a fancy label for a simple idea: People compete, and they always do what they think is in their own best interest. Bueno de Mesquita uses game theory and its insights into human behavior to predict and even engineer political, financial, and personal events. His forecasts, which have been employed by everyone from the CIA to major business firms, have an amazing 90 percent accuracy rate, and in this dazzling and revelatory book he shares his startling methods and lets you play along in a range of high-stakes negotiations and conflicts.
Revealing the origins of game theory and the advances made by John Nash, the Nobel Prize—winning scientist perhaps best known from
, Bueno de Mesquita details the controversial and cold-eyed system of calculation that he has since created, one that allows individuals to think strategically about what their opponents want, how much they want it, and how they might react to every move. From there, Bueno de Mesquita games such events as the North Korean disarmament talks and the Middle East peace process and recalls, among other cases, how he correctly predicted which corporate clients of the Arthur Andersen accounting firm were most likely engaged in fraudulent activity (hint: one of them started with an E). And looking as ever to the future, Bueno de Mesquita also demonstrates how game theory can provide successful strategies to combat both global warming (instead of relying on empty regulations, make nations compete in technology) and terror (figure out exactly how much U.S. aid will make Pakistan fight the Taliban).
But as Bueno de Mesquita shows, game theory isn’t just for saving the world. It can help you in your own life, whether you want to succeed in a lawsuit (lawyers argue too much the merits of the case and question too little the motives of their opponents), elect the CEO of your company (change the system of voting on your board to be more advantageous to your candidate), or even buy a car (start by knowing exactly what you want, call every dealer in a fifty-mile radius, and negotiate only over the phone).
Savvy, provocative, and shockingly effective,
will change how you understand the world and manage your future. Life’s a game, and how you play is whether you win or lose.

Now featuring a new chapter on the rise of illiberalism worldwide.



As featured in the viral video “Rules for Rulers,” which has been viewed over fifteen million times.

Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith’s canonical book on political science turned conventional wisdom on its head. They started from a single assertion: leaders do whatever keeps them in power. They don’t care about the “national interest”—or even their subjects—unless they must.

Newly updated to reflect the global rise of authoritarianism, this clever and accessible book illustrates how leaders amass and retain power. As Bueno de Mesquita and Smith show, democracy is essentially just a convenient fiction. Governments do not differ in kind, but only in the number of essential supporters or backs that need scratching. The size of this group determines almost everything about politics: what leaders can get away with, and the quality of life or misery under them. And it is also the key to returning power to the people.