The continuities between human and animal minds are increasingly well understood. This has led many people to make claims about consciousness in animals, which has often been taken to be crucial for their moral standing. Peter Carruthers argues compellingly that there is no fact of the matter to be discovered, and that the question of animal consciousness is of no scientific or ethical significance.
Carruthers offers solutions to two related puzzles. The first is about the place of phenomenal—or felt—consciousness in the natural order. Consciousness is shown to comprise fine-grained nonconceptual contents that are "globally broadcast" to a wide range of cognitive systems for reasoning, decision-making, and verbal report. Moreover, the so-called "hard" problem of consciousness results merely from the distinctive first-person concepts we can use when thinking about such contents. No special non-physical properties—no so-called "qualia"—are involved. The second puzzle concerns the distribution of phenomenal consciousness across the animal kingdom. Carruthers shows that there is actually no fact of the matter, because thoughts about consciousness in other creatures require us to project our first-person concepts into their minds; but such projections fail to result in determinate truth-conditions when those minds are significantly unlike our own. This upshot, however, doesn't matter. It doesn't matter for science, because no additional property enters the world as one transitions from creatures that are definitely incapable of phenomenal consciousness to those that definitely are (namely, ourselves). And on many views it doesn't matter for ethics, either, since concern for animals can be grounded in sympathy, which requires only third-person understanding of the desires and emotions of the animals in question, rather than in first-person empathy.

做一只章鱼或乌贼是怎样的？
动物是否能意识到自身感觉到的一切？
完全不像人脑的大脑会如何看待世界？
哲学×演化 → 心灵×物质
主观经验的演化起源也许未必以“有类似人脑的复杂大脑”为前提
特别说明：乌贼也是本书的重要角色！
◎ 编辑推荐
☆写作层次丰富，拓展多元新知：这是一部视角多维的自然志和哲学分析笔记。作者作为一名哲学家，跳离扶手椅中的空想推论，一跃潜入海面之下，搜寻探究他心问题（the problem of other minds）的信息拼图。他以人类的心灵，观察、跟踪和理解章鱼、乌贼等他者的心灵，让文字在哲学和科学之间无缝切换。
☆收录作者本人的潜水摄影：作者早年就通过博客记录下自己的潜水经历、与章鱼和乌贼相遇的种种趣闻，还有前沿的研究报道。本书不仅通过文字重现了这个哲学家对头足纲动物产生兴趣的过程，还穿插了作者和潜水同伴在水下（尤其在章鱼城邦架设GoPro相机）拍摄到的精彩照片和视频截图。书中还精选了部分彩插，为我们生动展现了头足纲动物调色、摆造型和追赶打斗的细节。
☆从潜水爱好到学术研究，从专业探索到社会关怀：作者的写作和思考并不止步于满足自己的好奇心和研究旨趣。作者在书中还为我们展示了海洋环境变迁的一角历史，他本人同时积极投身澳大利亚本土的生物多样性与海洋保护行动，并把这本书题献给每一个保护海洋的人。
☆已翻译成20多种语言版本，备受各界赞赏：《科学》《科学美国人》《纽约时报》《大西洋月刊》《金融时报》《卫报》《华尔街日报》《伦敦书评》等科学媒体、大众文化媒体和潜水专业杂志赞赏热评。本书还曾入围2017年英国皇家学会科学图书奖终选。
◎ 内容简介
海洋是心灵（mind）的起源地，或者说，心灵最早期的模糊形式是在海洋中形成的。痴迷潜水的心灵哲学（Philosophy of Mind）研究者彼得·戈弗雷-史密斯，关注从演化角度探索意识是如何从生物体的身体基础上产生的、动物是如何演化出主观经验的，也就是动物身为这种动物的特别感受。当这位全身包裹着橡胶的哺乳动物代表和一只同样对他充满好奇的头足纲动物在海中相遇，物质和心灵既在物理层面互相牵引，也为身心关系的研究带来了不同于人类的、他者意义上的全新认识。
在大约6亿年前，哺乳动物与头足纲动物走上了各自的演化之路。头足纲动物从只能吸附着平移，到像齐柏林飞艇一样自由地游向高处，然后到彻底抛弃外壳、再无固定形状——在身体形状不断变化的过程中，它们的感官、行为和心灵也在输入和输出的反馈中演化出了不同于其他动物的特征：它们的大部分神经系统不在大脑，而是遍布全身；它们用触腕卷上你的时候，并不是在触摸你，而是在感觉你是否能吃；关于章鱼的高智力趣闻传得神乎其神，可是它们的寿命又令人费解的短暂……如何去理解这些接近外星智能生命的动物的心灵？这本既关于哲学也关于动物演化的小书或许能够带来启发。
◎ 媒体推荐
说这是一本哲学书是成立的，因为戈弗雷-史密斯是一个很少见的在现实世界中搜寻线索的哲学家。渊博且富有好奇心，他小心探索，又细细欣赏。他是充满善意的自然探索者。他从不教条，还惊人地敏锐。
——卡尔·萨菲那，《纽约时报·书评》（The New York Times Book Review）
令人入迷且意义深远……戈弗雷-史密斯潜入海洋，进行了一次非常独特的哲学之旅。我们跟着这位活力满满的潜水者，同时也是一位令人钦佩的作家，看他研究和思考头足纲动物的生命和意识的起源……从本书的书名，以及戈弗雷-史密斯对自己和章鱼相遇的描述，我们都可以清晰地看出，他相信，这些动物都有意识。
——史蒂芬·凯夫，《金融时报》（Financial Times）
在彼得·戈弗雷-史密斯看来，章鱼的异质性一定程度上反映了意识的本质，而且它们这种有意识的状态不能通过简单类比人类的意识来理解。戈弗雷-史密斯从认为意识是演化的产物出发，再到承认意识有更原始的起源：动物的意识是连续过渡演化的。
——埃米娅·斯里尼瓦桑，《伦敦书评》（London Review of Books）
我爱这本书，它在书中娴熟地交织了自然志、哲学和好奇心。本书带我们潜入深海，不止潜入波浪之下，还近距离地接触了神秘且有高智力的章鱼，透过数亿年的演化史叩问意识的本质和起源。戈弗雷-史密斯通过生动、文雅的叙述为我们讲述这个引人入胜的故事。
——詹妮弗·阿克曼，《鸟类的天赋》（The Genius of Birds）作者
◎ 获奖信息
★《纽约时报·书评》年度编辑推荐
★《出版人周刊》2016年季度十佳科普著作

意识问题被认为是“科学的最后一个伟大秘密”，一度被极端的怀疑主义者和主流科学家拒绝研究。现在，它是一个重要的研究领域——“意识的生物学基础是什么？”在《科学》(Science)公布的125个最具挑战性的科学问题中高居第二位。尽管它仍然是一个充满争议的领域，但对于心理学、哲学和神经科学的学生来说，也是一个在快速扩大的研究领域。
本书探讨了从神经科学和心理学到哲学和量子理论的意识研究的关键理论及证据。它探究了为什么“意识”一词没有一致的定义，也让读者有机会去探究关于自我、心智和意识的个人直觉。
本书涵盖了该领域所有核心主题，包括：
·为什么研究意识问题如此困难？
·神经科学和意识的神经关联。
·为什么我们会误解自己的思想？
·意识和无意识之间的明显区别。
·关于注意、自由意志和自我及其他的理论。
·动物和机器中意识的进化。
·从冥想、用药到做梦的意识改变状态。
本书还提供了关键概念专栏、知名思想家的小传，以及适合于独立研究和进行小组讨论的练习与活动专栏，为意识这个迷人的领域提供了完整而全面的介绍。

The study of concepts has advanced dramatically in recent years, with exciting new findings and theoretical developments. Core concepts have been investigated in greater depth and new lines of inquiry have blossomed, with researchers from an ever broader range of disciplines making important contributions. In this volume, leading philosophers and cognitive scientists offer original essays that present the state-of-the-art in the study of concepts. These essays, all commissioned for this book, do not merely present the usual surveys and overviews; rather, they offer the latest work on concepts by a diverse group of theorists as well as discussions of the ideas that should guide research over the next decade. The book is an essential companion volume to the earlier Concepts: Core Readings, the definitive source for classic texts on the nature of concepts.
The essays cover concepts as they relate to animal cognition, the brain, evolution, perception, and language, concepts across cultures, concept acquisition and conceptual change, concepts and normativity, concepts in context, and conceptual individuation. The contributors include such prominent scholars as Susan Carey, Nicola Clayton, Jerry Fodor, Douglas Medin, Joshua Tenenbaum, and Anna Wierzbicka.

"Intention", first published in 1957, has acquired the status of a modern philosophical classic. The book attempts to show in detail that the natural and widely accepted picture of what we mean by an intention gives rise to insoluble problems and must be abandoned.

随着认知神经科学的进步，神经法律研究的主题迅速发展。它与法律和法律程序的相关性与依存性，以及神经科学证据在刑法中的可采性，都是重要的话题。帕尔多教授和帕特森教授撰写了一本及时的书，对神经法律研究进行了细致的概念审查。他们带来了令人印象深刻的神经科学与法律的知识，以及一流的哲学敏锐性。他们清晰地写出并公平地展示竞争对手的案例。他们的批判性论点是强有力的和令人信服的，并将深刻影响当前对法律与神经科学之间关系的看法。所有关注认知神经科学与法律相关性的律师和法官，以及所有法学院学生都应该研究《心智、大脑与法律：法律神经科学的概念基础》。

还原论是西方哲学的重要传统理论，是当代哲学家和科学家集中谈论的热烈话题之一。刘明海所著的《还原论研究》详细梳理了还原论的历史演进，深入发掘了还原论的思想起源，全面总结了还原论的论证过程，具体呈现了还原论的思想内容。并以此为基础，《还原论研究》分别探讨了还原论在当代科技哲学、心灵哲学中的发展现状，既涉及反还原论提出的挑战与诘难，也涉及还原论做出的回应与反驳，进而阐释还原论对于生物现象、心理现象这些人类“斯芬克斯之谜”的启示性看法，重新正确评价还原论在哲学和科学发展中的地位与价值。

The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the first of its kind in the field, and its appearance marks a unique time in the history of intellectual inquiry on the topic. After decades during which consciousness was considered beyond the scope of legitimate scientific investigation, consciousness re-emerged as a popular focus of research towards the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now so many different lines of investigation on consciousness that the time has come when the field may finally benefit from a book that pulls them together and, by juxtaposing them, provides a comprehensive survey of this exciting field. An authoritative desk reference, which will also be suitable as an advanced textbook.

A study in the philosophy of science, proposing a strong form of the doctrine of scientific realism' and developing its implications for issues in the philosophy of mind.

本卷包括三部论著：《从逻辑的观点看》（1953），《语词和对象》（1960），以及《指称之根》（1974）。第一部是蒯因最有影响的一本论文集，收入《论何物存在》、《经验论的两个教条》等9篇论文，主要探讨本体论承诺、分析性、意义、共相等问题，对分析命题和综合命题的区分以及还原论这两个传统观点做了有力批判。第二部是蒯因哲学的代表作，对前一本书中提出的论点做了重大发展，在“彻底翻译”的语境中，阐述和论证了翻译的不确定性、指称的不可测知性、本体论的相对性等重要论题。第三部详细阐述了作者的指称发生理论，是对《语词和对象》等著作中的观点的进一步发展。

语义外在论是心灵哲学和语言哲学中最受关注也是最困难的主题之一，对我们理解社会制度和物理环境对语言和心灵的影响具有非常重要的意义。本书首先深入介绍了描述主义和指称主义的各种理论版本，尤其是对弗雷格和克里普克的相关理论做了重点的考察，随后讨论了语义外在论在研究索引性思想、认识论的怀疑论、自我知识和心灵因果关系等重大论题中的核心作用，书中对普特南的“孪生地球”论证、伯奇的“关节炎”论证和戴维森的“沼泽人”论证等著名的论证做了精彩的分析。本书内容丰富，介绍和探讨了大量名家关于语义外在论的文献，对该主题的研究提供了一份极其宝贵的“地图”.

本书是初稿系约翰·塞尔在1984年英国广播公司举办的里思学术系列广播讲座上的演讲稿，经修改后以《心、脑与科学》书名于当年出版、被西方哲学评论家誉为“比他以往任何著作都更广，更深地表述了他的心的哲学观点”。
当代英美分析哲学及语言哲学往往拘泥于命题，语词的研究，而忽略了哲学的基本问题。塞尔将语言哲学的观点用于研究心身问题。塞尔将语言哲学的观点用于研究心身问题，使语言哲学也开始回归传统的哲学基本问题，而且，其研究方法富于当代语言哲学的色彩。

In this engaging book, Jerry Fodor argues against the widely held view that mental processes are largely computations, that the architecture of cognition is massively modular, and that the explanation of our innate mental structure is basically Darwinian. Although Fodor has praised the computational theory of mind as the best theory of cognition that we have got, he considers it to be only a fragment of the truth. In fact, he claims, cognitive scientists do not really know much yet about how the mind works (the book's title refers to Steve Pinker's How the Mind Works).Fodor's primary aim is to explore the relationship among computational and modular theories of mind, nativism, and evolutionary psychology. Along the way, he explains how Chomsky's version of nativism differs from that of the widely received New Synthesis approach. He concludes that although we have no grounds to suppose that most of the mind is modular, we have no idea how nonmodular cognition could work. Thus, according to Fodor, cognitive science has hardly gotten started.

Five chapters in the book's first part, "Some Elementary Neuroscience," sketch the history of the science of nervous systems and provide a general introduction to neurophysiology, neuroanatomy, and neuropsychology. In the second part, "Recent Developments in the Philosophy of Science," chapters place the mind-body problem within the wider context of the philosophy of science. Drawing on recent research in this area, a general account of intertheoretic reduction is explained, arguments for a reductionist strategy are developed, and traditional objections from dualists and other anti reductionists are answered in novel ways. The third part, "A Neurophilosophical Perspective," concludes the book with a presentation and discussion of some of the most promising theoretical developments currently under exploration in functional neurobiology and in the connectionist models within artificial intelligence research.Patricia Churchland is Professor of Philosophy, University of California, San Diego. A Bradford Book.

The Embodied Mind provides a unique, sophisticated treatment of the spontaneous and reflective dimension of human experience. The authors - argue that only by having a sense of common ground between mind in Science and mind in experience can our understanding of cognition be more complete. Toward that end, they develop a dialogue between cognitive science and Buddhist meditative psychology and situate it in relation to other traditions such as phenomenology and psychoanalysis.Francisco Varela is Director of Research at the Centre National de Recherche Scientifique and Professor of Cognitive Science and Epistemology, CREA, at the Ecole Polytechnique in Paris. Evan Thompson is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the University of Toronto. Eleanor Rosch is Professor of Psychology at the University of California, Berkeley.

《心灵种种:对意识的探索》语言流畅，文笔优美，既通俗易懂，又富含哲理，实为一本不可多得的科普佳作。心灵是什么？《心灵种种:对意识的探索》从这个最常见的问题出发，综合哲学、人工智能与神经科学的思想，带领读者走过一段扣人心弦的探询之旅，思索一些引人入胜的问题：我们有谁真能知道他人的心思？人的心灵与动物的心灵有何区别？假如这些动物神奇地获得了语言能力，它们会进化出像我们那样能够明察秋毫的智力吗？