Includes a new Afterword
Finalist for the Council on Foreign Relations Arthur Ross Book Award
One of the world’s foremost authorities on the subject of suicide terrorism, the esteemed political scientist Robert Pape has created the first comprehensive database of every suicide terrorist attack in the world from 1980 until today. In Dying to Win , Pape provides a groundbreaking demographic profile of modern suicide terrorist attackers–and his findings offer a powerful counterpoint to what we now accept as conventional wisdom on the topic. He also examines the early practitioners of this guerrilla tactic, including the ancient Jewish Zealots, who in A.D. 66 wished to liberate themselves from Roman occupation; the Ismaili Assassins, a Shi’ite Muslim sect in northern Iran in the eleventh and twelfth centuries; World War II’s Japanese kamikaze pilots, three thousand of whom crashed into U.S. naval vessels; and the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, a secular, Marxist-Leninist organization responsible for more suicide terrorist attacks than any other group in history.
Dying to Win is a startling work of analysis grounded in fact, not politics, that recommends concrete ways for states to fight and prevent terrorist attacks now. Transcending speculation with systematic scholarship, this is one of the most important studies of the terrorist threat to the United States and its allies since 9/11.
“Invaluable . . . gives Americans an urgently needed basis for devising a strategy to defeat Osama bin Laden and other Islamist militants.”
–Michael Scheuer, author of Imperial Hubris
“Provocative . . . Pape wants to change the way you think about suicide bombings and explain why they are on the rise.”
–Henry Schuster, CNN.com

“Enlightening . . . sheds interesting light on a phenomenon often mistakenly believed to be restricted to the Middle East.”
–The Washington Post Book World
“Brilliant.”
–Peter Bergen, author of Holy War, Inc.

This book develops an original theory of group and organizational behavior that cuts across disciplinary lines and illustrates the theory with empirical and historical studies of particular organizations. Applying economic analysis to the subjects of the political scientist, sociologist, and economist, Mr. Olson examines the extent to which the individuals that share a common interest find it in their individual interest to bear the costs of the organizational effort.
The theory shows that most organizations produce what the economist calls "public goods"--goods or services that are available to every member, whether or not he has borne any of the costs of providing them. Economists have long understood that defense, law and order were public goods that could not be marketed to individuals, and that taxation was necessary. They have not, however, taken account of the fact that private as well as governmental organizations produce public goods.

《民主的经济理论》代表了将现代经济学的标准分析方法——一般均衡方法论——应用于政治科学的第一次系统的尝试。其基本出发点是：政治当事人（选民、政党与政府），也像经济当事人（消费者与生产者）一样，服从基本的“理性人”假设，即他们总是在给定的制度和非制度的约束下，最大限度地追求自己的私利。在这一基本的“理性人”假设下，《民主的经济理论》分析的重点在于理性的政治当事人会怎样行为，以及这些行为会产生什么后果。这样，与传统的政治科学相比，安东尼·唐斯的工作引入了两个全新的成分：（1）将全部理论分析置于一个基本的行为假设（“理性人”假设）之上；（2）从基本的行为假设（“理性人”假设）出发，得出经验上可检验的结论。上述做法体现了社会科学科学化的一个基本特征：公理化方法与实证方法的结合。与加里·贝克尔将经济学方法应用于社会领域的开创性工作一样，安东尼·唐斯的工作同样构成了将经济学应用于理解人类生活合理秩序的知识努力的具有永久价值的一部分。

In this incisive analysis of one of the most spectacular economic breakthroughs in the Deng era, Jean C. Oi shows how and why Chinese rural-based industry has become the fastest growing economic sector not just in China but in the world. Oi argues that decollectivization and fiscal decentralization provided party officials of the localities—counties, townships, and villages—with the incentives to act as entrepreneurs and to promote rural industrialization in many areas of the Chinese countryside. As a result, the corporatism practiced by local officials has become effective enough to challenge the centrality of the national state.
Dealing not only with the political setting of rural industrial development, Oi's original and strongly argued study also makes a broader contribution to conceptualizations of corporatism in political theory. Oi writes provocatively about property rights and principal-agent relationships and shows the complex financial incentives that underpin and strengthen the growth in local state corporatism and shape its evolution. This book will be essential for those interested in Chinese politics, comparative politics, and communist and post-communist systems.