Thomas C. Schelling
简介
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory-the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
contents
I. Elements of a Theory of Strategy
1. The Retarded Science of International Strategy
2. An Essay on Bargaining
3. Bargaining, Communication, and Limited War
II. A Reorientation of Game Theory
4. Toward a Theory of Interdependent Decision
5. Enforcement, Communication, and Strategic Moves
6. Game Theory and Experimental Research
III. Strategy with a Random Ingredient
7. Randomization of Promises and Threats
8. The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance
IV. Surprise Attack: A Study in Mutual Distrust
9. The Reciprocal Fear of Surprise Attack
10. Surprise Attack and Disarmament
Appendices
A. Nuclear Weapons and Limited War
B. For the Abandonment of Symmetry in Game Theory
C. Re-interpretation of a Solution Concept for "Noncooperative" Games Index
