莱比锡图书奖得主经典哲学著作；20余位欧洲哲学家跨越时空的思想交锋；四个著名思想实验，一场关于世界大同的道德辩论！
为什么我们总是对远处的灾难报以极大的同情，却对身边的不幸兴趣寥寥？世界被科技手段无限缩小，也把远处的不幸拉近到每个人身边。狄德罗相信五感的界限就是道德的界限，传媒技术将我们的感知力拓展到全球，让我们对千里之外的陌生人似乎也产生了道德责任；而卢梭认为人类的情感被距离拉伸时，必然会挥发、黯淡，我们之所以如此关注远处的灾难，正是因为我们不愿意承担身边的义务。
德国知名作家、莱比锡图书奖得主汉宁·里德引用了十八世纪以来的几个著名思想实验，巴尔扎克、卢梭、伏尔泰、亚当·斯密等启蒙精英到陀思妥耶夫斯基、弗洛伊德、荣格等文学与思想巨擘跨越时空的思想交锋，掀起了一场关于世界大同的道德辩论。

德国哲学家当中，叔本华是最有可读性的一位。本书对叔本华的形而上学哲学体系进行了简洁的阐释，尤其聚焦于叔本华思想的原创性特征，这种原创性启发了包括尼采、瓦格纳、弗洛伊德、维特根斯坦等在内的许多艺术家和思想家。作者将笔锋直接指向叔本华毫不妥协的悲观主义观点，即对人类个体来说，最好的境况是不曾出生，只有圣人般的自我否定（摒弃欲望）才能赋予生命价值。本书展示的叔本华，是一个具有战斗精神、气势咄咄逼人、影响力非凡的思想家。

What is empiricism and what could it be? Bas C. van Fraassen, one of the world's foremost contributors to philosophical logic and the philosophy of science, here undertakes a fresh consideration of these questions and offers a program for renewal of the empiricist tradition. The empiricist tradition is not and could not be defined by common doctrines, but embodies a certain stance in philosophy, van Fraassen says. This stance is displayed first of all in a searing, recurrent critique of metaphysics, and second in a focus on experience that requires a voluntarist view of belief and opinion. Van Fraassen focuses on the philosophical problems of scientific and conceptual revolutions and on the not unrelated ruptures between religious and secular ways of seeing or conceiving of ourselves. He explores what it is to be or not be secular and points the way toward a new relationship between secularism and science within philosophy.

This book reconsiders the dominant Western understandings of freedom through the lens of women's real-life experiences of domestic violence, welfare, and Islamic veiling. Nancy Hirschmann argues that the typical approach to freedom found in political philosophy severely reduces the concept's complexity, which is more fully revealed by taking such practical issues into account.<br /><br /><br /><br />Hirschmann begins by arguing that the dominant Western understanding of freedom does not provide a conceptual vocabulary for accurately characterizing women's experiences. Often, free choice is assumed when women are in fact coerced--as when a battered woman who stays with her abuser out of fear or economic necessity is said to make this choice because it must not be so bad--and coercion is assumed when free choices are made--such as when Westerners assume that all veiled women are oppressed, even though many Islamic women view veiling as an important symbol of cultural identity.<br /><br />Understanding the contexts in which choices arise and are made is central to understanding that freedom is socially constructed through systems of power such as patriarchy, capitalism, and race privilege. Social norms, practices, and language set the conditions within which choices are made, determine what options are available, and shape our individual subjectivity, desires, and self-understandings. Attending to the ways in which contexts construct us as "subjects" of liberty, Hirschmann argues, provides a firmer empirical and theoretical footing for understanding what freedom means and entails politically, intellectually, and socially.

Using the writings of slaves and former slaves, as well as commentaries on slavery, "Between Slavery and Freedom" explores the American slave experience to gain a better understanding of six moral and political concepts - oppression, paternalism, resistance, political obligation, citizenship, and forgiveness. The authors use analytical philosophy as well as other disciplines to gain insight into the thinking of a group of people prevented from participating in the social/political discourse of their times. "Between Slavery and Freedom" rejects the notion that philosophers need not consider individual experience because philosophy is "impartial" and "universal." A philosopher should also take account of matters that are essentially perspectival, such as the slave experience. McGary and Lawson demonstrate the contribution of all human experience, including slave experiences, to the quest for human knowledge and understanding.

This edition of Prolegomena includes Kant's letter of February 1772 to Marcus Herz, a momentous document in which Kant relates the progress of his thinking and announces that he is now ready to present a critique of pure reason.

Donald Cress's highly regarded translation, based on the critical Pleiade edition of 1964, is here issued with a lively introduction by James Miller, who brings into sharp focus the cultural and intellectual milieu in which Rousseau operated. This new edition includes a select bibliography, a note on the text, a translator's note, and Rousseau's own Notes on the Discourse.

《汉译世界学术名著丛书:面包与自由》是作者克鲁泡特金在1886年，就法国社会改造而写的。他从政治、经济的角度，批判了现实社会制度，对代议制、法律、强权等，进行了分析与抨击。同时提出无政府共产主义的经济与政治主张——若废除私有制，实行共产共有、经济平等，消灭国家，取消政府，废除法律，由各种自由联合的社团代替强权的国家，由社团成员的自由意志，代替法律的力量，以互助的形式和科学的方法提高社会劳动生产等。

This book grew out of a sense that contemporary philosophy lacks a self-image that does it justice. Of the self-images that philosophy inherited from the twentieth century, the most prominent – natural-ism, the linguistic turn, postmodern irony, and so on – seemed obviously inadequate to most of the most interesting work in contemporary philosophy: as descriptions, false when bold, uninformative when cautious. Less prominent alternatives too seemed implausible or ill-
developed. Although an adequate self-image is not a recondition of all virtue, it helps. If philosophy misconceives what it is doing, it is likely to do it worse. In any case, an adequate self-image is worth having for its own sake; we are not supposed to be leading the unexamined life. This is my attempt to do better.

In order to perfectly describe the world, it is not enough to speak truly. In this ambitious and ground-breaking book, Theodore Sider argues that for a representation to be fully successful, truth is not enough; the representation must also use the right concepts-concepts that 'carve at the joints'-so that its conceptual structure matches reality's structure. There is an objectively correct way to 'write the book of the world'. Sider's argument begins from the assertion that metaphysics is about the fundamental structure of reality. Not about what's necessarily true; not about what properties are essential; not about conceptual analysis; and not about what there is. While inquiry into necessity, essence, concepts, or ontology might help to illuminate reality's structure, the ultimate goal is insight into this structure. Sider argues that part of the theory of structure is an account of how structure connects to other concepts. For example, structure can be used to illuminate laws of nature, explanation, reference, induction, physical geometry, substantivity, conventionality, objectivity, and metametaphysics. Another part is an account of how structure behaves. Since structure is a way of thinking about fundamentality, Sider's account implies distinctive answers to questions about the nature of fundamentality. These answers distinguish his theory of structure from other recent theories of fundamentality, including Kit Fine's theory of ground and reality, the theory of truthmaking, and Jonathan Schaffer's theory of ontological dependence.

Modern philosophy finds it difficult to give a satisfactory picture of the place of minds in the world. In "Mind and World", based on the 1991 John Locke Lectures, John McDowell offers his diagnosis of this difficulty and points to a cure. He illustrates a major problem of modern philosophy - the insidious persistence of dualism - in his discussion of empirical thought. Much as we would like to conceive empirical thought as rationally grounded in experience, pitfalls await anyone who tries to articulate this position, and McDowell exposes these traps by exploiting the work of contemporary philosophers from Wilfrid Sellars to Donald Davidson. These difficulties, he contends, reflect an understandable - but surmountable - failure to see how we might integrate what Sellars calls "the logical space of reasons" into the natural world. What underlies this impasse is a conception of nature that has certain attractions for the modern age, a conception that McDowell proposes to put aside, thus circumventing these philosophical difficulties. By returning to a pre-modern conception of nature but retaining the intellectual advance of modernity that has mistakenly been viewed as dislodging it, he makes room for a fully satisfying conception of experience as a rational openness to independent reality. This approach also overcomes other obstacles that impede a generally satisfying understanding of how we are placed in the world.

Bas C. van Fraassen presents an original exploration of how we represent the world. Science represents natural phenomena by means of theories, as well as in many concrete ways by such means as pictures, graphs, table-top models, and computer simulations. Scientific Representation begins with an inquiry into the nature of representation in general, drawing on such diverse sources as Plato's dialogues, the development of perspectival drawing in the Renaissance, and the geometric styles of modelling in modern physics. Starting with Mach's and Poincare's analyses of measurement and the 'problem of coordination', van Fraassen then presents a view of measurement outcomes as representations. With respect to the theories of contemporary science he defends an empiricist structuralist version of the 'picture theory' of science, through an inquiry into the paradoxes that came to light in twentieth-century philosophies of science. Van Fraassen concludes with an analysis of the complex relationship between appearance and reality in the scientific world-picture.

◎ 浪漫主义的艺术成就有多璀璨，它的政治实践就有多危险。
◎ 从歌德到尼采，伴随着浪漫主义，德国式的深邃思想，不仅获得渴望和忧伤的色彩，还带有满不在乎和举重若轻的秉性。
◎ 纵贯德国200年，阿多诺弟子、“最会讲故事”的德国思想史畅销作家萨弗兰斯基倾力之作。
这是一部德国浪漫主义的简史。从1750年左右，一直写到1990年左右 ，囊括200年。
启蒙思想的重大错误之一就是低估了非理性力量的威力，在德国，启蒙运动早早就孕生了一股反对自身的力量。针对启蒙运动的明晰，浪漫主义者倡导搅动人的“幽暗的本能”，即世人身上的狄俄尼索斯之力或非理性，来对抗阿波罗的理性及其带来的“异化的社会机械论”，它延续了人类平衡物质与精神、现实与理想、肉体与灵魂、理智与情感之冲突的努力，带来了一个文学、哲学和宗教融会一处的激情时代。
但是，就像雅努斯的两张面孔，浪漫主义作为一个思想运动结束后，在20世纪，带给德国的却是并不光彩的历史。“浪漫的”思维方式，或者“浪漫主义的精神姿态”，作为德意志民族的性格要素，越出文学疆域，染上民族主义色彩，开始涉足政治，在“一战”期间变身为所谓的“钢铁浪漫主义”，在纳粹时期又被再度利用。政治的浪漫主义，既无益于浪漫主义也无益于政治。
作者在完整地分梳德国浪漫主义脉络之时，并不以绵密的考证见长，却以通达的见识和宏阔的视野取胜。其表述感性酣畅，充满灵性，更贴近浪漫主义之生命的本体，以及浪漫主义作家之灵魂的此在，十分具有可读性。

Metaphysics asks questions about existence: for example, do numbers really exist? Metametaphysics asks questions about metaphysics: for example, do its questions have determinate answers? If so, are these answers deep and important, or are they merely a matter of how we use words? What is the proper methodology for their resolution? These questions have received a heightened degree of attention lately with new varieties of ontological deflationism and pluralism challenging the kind of realism that has become orthodoxy in contemporary analytic metaphysics.
This volume concerns the status and ambitions of metaphysics as a discipline. It brings together many of the central figures in the debate with their most recent work on the semantics, epistemology, and methodology of metaphysics.

This long-awaited book replaces Hughes and Cresswell's two classic studies of modal logic: An Introduction to Modal Logic and A Companion to Modal Logic. A New Introduction to Modal Logic is an entirely new work, completely re-written by the authors. They have incorporated all the new developments that have taken place since 1968 in both modal propositional logic and modal predicate logic, without sacrificing tha clarity of exposition and approachability that were essential features of their earlier works. The book takes readers from the most basic systems of modal propositional logic right up to systems of modal predicate with identity. It covers both technical developments such as completeness and incompleteness, and finite and infinite models, and their philosophical applications, especially in the area of modal predicate logic.

This is a major, wide-ranging history of analytic philosophy since 1900, told by one of the tradition's leading contemporary figures. The first volume takes the story from 1900 to mid-century. The second brings the history up to date.
As Scott Soames tells it, the story of analytic philosophy is one of great but uneven progress, with leading thinkers making important advances toward solving the tradition's core problems. Though no broad philosophical position ever achieved lasting dominance, Soames argues that two methodological developments have, over time, remade the philosophical landscape. These are (1) analytic philosophers' hard-won success in understanding, and distinguishing the notions of logical truth, a priori truth, and necessary truth, and (2) gradual acceptance of the idea that philosophical speculation must be grounded in sound prephilosophical thought. Though Soames views this history in a positive light, he also illustrates the difficulties, false starts, and disappointments endured along the way. As he engages with the work of his predecessors and contemporaries--from Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein to Donald Davidson and Saul Kripke--he seeks to highlight their accomplishments while also pinpointing their shortcomings, especially where their perspectives were limited by an incomplete grasp of matters that have now become clear.
Soames himself has been at the center of some of the tradition's most important debates, and throughout writes with exceptional ease about its often complex ideas. His gift for clear exposition makes the history as accessible to advanced undergraduates as it will be important to scholars. Despite its centrality to philosophy in the English-speaking world, the analytic tradition in philosophy has had very few synthetic histories. This will be the benchmark against which all future accounts will be measured.

This is a major, wide-ranging history of analytic philosophy since 1900, told by one of the tradition's leading contemporary figures. The first volume takes the story from 1900 to mid-century. The second brings the history up to date.
As Scott Soames tells it, the story of analytic philosophy is one of great but uneven progress, with leading thinkers making important advances toward solving the tradition's core problems. Though no broad philosophical position ever achieved lasting dominance, Soames argues that two methodological developments have, over time, remade the philosophical landscape. These are (1) analytic philosophers' hard-won success in understanding, and distinguishing the notions of logical truth, a priori truth, and necessary truth, and (2) gradual acceptance of the idea that philosophical speculation must be grounded in sound prephilosophical thought. Though Soames views this history in a positive light, he also illustrates the difficulties, false starts, and disappointments endured along the way. As he engages with the work of his predecessors and contemporaries--from Bertrand Russell and Ludwig Wittgenstein to Donald Davidson and Saul Kripke--he seeks to highlight their accomplishments while also pinpointing their shortcomings, especially where their perspectives were limited by an incomplete grasp of matters that have now become clear.
Soames himself has been at the center of some of the tradition's most important debates, and throughout writes with exceptional ease about its often complex ideas. His gift for clear exposition makes the history as accessible to advanced undergraduates as it will be important to scholars. Despite its centrality to philosophy in the English-speaking world, the analytic tradition in philosophy has had very few synthetic histories. This will be the benchmark against which all future accounts will be measured.

In The Construction of Social Reality, John Searle argues that there are two kinds of facts--some that are independent of human observers, and some that require human agreement.