A Theory of Justice is a widely-read book of political and moral philosophy by John Rawls. It was originally published in 1971 and revised in both 1975 (for the translated editions) and 1999. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls attempts to solve the problem of distributive justice by utilising a variant of the familiar device of the social contract. The resultant theory is known as "Justice as Fairness", from which Rawls derives his two famous principles of justice: the liberty principle and the difference principle.
[edit] Objective
In A Theory of Justice Rawls argues for a principled reconciliation of liberty and equality. Central to this effort is an account of the circumstances of justice (inspired by David Hume), and a fair choice situation (closer in spirit to Kant) for parties facing such circumstances, and seeking principles of justice to guide their conduct. These parties face moderate scarcity, and they are neither naturally altruistic nor purely egoistic: they have ends they seek to advance, but desire to advance them through cooperation with others on mutually acceptable terms. Rawls offers a model of a fair choice situation (the original position with its veil of ignorance) within which parties would hypothetically choose mutually acceptable principles of justice. Under such constraints, Rawls believes that parties would find his favoured principles of justice to be especially attractive, winning out over varied alternatives, including utilitarian and libertarian accounts.
[edit] The "original position"
Main article: Original position
Like Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Kant, Rawls belongs to the social contract tradition. However, Rawls' social contract takes a slightly different form from that of previous thinkers. Specifically, Rawls develops what he claims are principles of justice through the use of an entirely and deliberately artificial device he calls the Original position, in which everyone decides principles of justice from behind a veil of ignorance. This "veil" is one that essentially blinds people to all facts about themselves that might cloud what notion of justice is developed.
"no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelligence, strength, and the like. I shall even assume that the parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of ignorance."
According to Rawls, ignorance of these details about oneself will lead to principles which are fair to all. If an individual does not know how he will end up in his own conceived society, he is likely not going to privilege any one class of people, but rather develop a scheme of justice that treats all fairly. In particular, Rawls claims that those in the Original Position would all adopt a maximin strategy which would maximise the position of the least well-off.
They are the principles that rational and free persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as defining the fundamentals of the terms of their association [Rawls, p 11]
It is important to keep in mind that the agreement that stems from the original position is both hypothetical and nonhistorical. It is hypothetical in the sense that the principles to be derived are what the parties would, under certain legitimating conditions, agree to, not what they have agreed to. In other words, Rawls seeks to persuade us through argument that the principles of justice that he derives are in fact what we would agree upon if we were in the hypothetical situation of the original position and that those principles have moral weight as a result of that. It is nonhistorical in the sense that it is not supposed that the agreement has ever, or indeed could actually be entered into as a matter of fact.
Rawls claims that the parties in the original position would adopt two such principles, which would then govern the assignment of rights and duties and regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages across society.
[edit] The First Principle of Justice
“ First: each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive scheme of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for others.[1] ”
The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (i.e., to vote and run for office); freedom of speech and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest. It is a matter of some debate whether freedom of contract can be inferred as being included among these basic liberties.
The first principle is more or less absolute, and may not be violated, even for the sake of the second principle, above an unspecified but low level of economic development (i.e. the first principle is, under most conditions, lexically prior to the second principle). However, because various basic liberties may conflict, it may be necessary to trade them off against each other for the sake of obtaining the largest possible system of rights. There is thus some uncertainty as to exactly what is mandated by the principle, and it is possible that a plurality of sets of liberties satisfy its requirements.
[edit] The Second Principle of Justice
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that (Rawls, 1971, p.303):
a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).
b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of (fair equality of opportunity)
Rawls' claim in b) is that departures from equality of a list of what he calls primary goods – 'things which a rational man wants whatever else he wants' [Rawls, 1971, pg. 92] – are justified only to the extent that they improve the lot of those who are worst-off under that distribution in comparison with the previous, equal, distribution. His position is at least in some sense egalitarian, with a proviso that equality is not to be achieved by worsening the position of the least advantaged. An important consequence here, however, is that inequalities can actually be just on Rawls's view, as long as they are to the benefit of the least well off. His argument for this position rests heavily on the claim that morally arbitrary factors (for example, the family we're born into) shouldn't determine our life chances or opportunities. Rawls is also keying on an intuition that we do not deserve inborn talents, thus we are not entitled to all the benefits we could possibly receive from them, meaning that at least one of the criteria which could provide an alternative to equality in assessing the justice of distributions is eliminated.
The stipulation in a) is prior to that in b) and requires more than meritocracy. 'Fair equality of opportunity' requires not merely that offices and positions are distributed on the basis of merit, but that all have reasonable opportunity to acquire the skills on the basis of which merit is assessed. It is often thought that this stipulation, and even the first principle of justice, may require greater equality than the difference principle, because large social and economic inequalities, even when they are to the advantage of the worst-off, will tend to seriously undermine the value of the political liberties and any measures towards fair equality of opportunity.
[edit] Relationship to Rawls's later work
Although Rawls never retreated from the core argument of A Theory of Justice, he modified his theory substantially in subsequent works. The discussion in this entry is limited to his views as they stood in A Theory of Justice, which stands on its own as an important (if controversial and much criticized) work of political philosophy.
His subsequent work is discussed in the entry titled John Rawls. Of particular note is his work Justice as Fairness: A Restatement (2001), in which he clarified and re-organised much of the argument of A Theory of Justice.
[edit] Critics of A Theory of Justice
A Theory of Justice made a significant contribution to re-establishing interest in political philosophy, and so it has served as the basis for much of the debate since, meaning that it has been much criticized.
In particular, Rawls's colleague at Harvard Robert Nozick wrote a defence of libertarian justice in the aftermath of A Theory of Justice, called Anarchy, State, and Utopia, which was critical of Rawls's work. Because it is, in part, a reaction to A Theory of Justice, the two books are now often read together. Another colleague of Rawls's from Harvard, Michael Walzer, wrote a defence of communitarian political philosophy, entitled "Spheres of Justice," as a result of a seminar he co-taught with Nozick.
Robert Paul Wolff wrote Understanding Rawls: A Critique and Reconstruction of A Theory of Justice immediately following the publication of A Theory of Justice, which criticized Rawls from a roughly Marxist perspective. Wolff argues in this work that Rawls's theory is an apology for the status quo insofar as it constructs justice from existing practice and forecloses the possibility that there may be problems of injustice embedded in capitalist social relations, private property or the market economy.
Feminist critics of Rawls largely focused on the extent to which Rawls's theory could account for, at all, injustices and hierarchies embedded in familial relations. Rawls argued that justice ought only to apply to the "basic structure of society" for instance, and feminists rallying around the theme of "the personal is political" took Rawls to task for failing to account for injustices found in patriarchal social relations and the sexual division of labor.
The assumptions of the original position, and in particular, the use of maximin reasoning, have also been criticized, with the implication either that Rawls designed the original position to derive the two principles, or that an original position more faithful to its initial purpose would not lead to his favored principles. However Rawls does not deny this, he uses the original position in conjunction with an intuitive argument to justify his claim of justice as fairness.
Some critics allege that Rawls' argument is weakened in failing to denote healthcare as a primary good. Proponents respond by asserting that affordable and accessible healthcare arises as an inevitable result of the benefits attained by following through with the Original Position.
One of the most influential recent criticisms of Rawls' theory has come from the philosopher G.A. Cohen, in a series of influential papers that culminate in his 2000 book If You're An Egalitarian, How Come You're So Rich? Cohen's criticisms are levelled against Rawls' avowal of inequality under the difference principle, against his application of the principle only to social institutions, and against Rawlsian fetishism with primary goods (the metric which Rawls chooses as his currency of equality).

Rationalism in Politics, first published in 1962, has established the late Michael Oakeshott as the leading conservative political theorist in modern Britain. This expanded collection of essays astutely points out the limits of 'reason' in rationalist politics. Oakeshott criticizes ideological schemes to reform society according to supposedly 'scientific' or rationalistic principles that ignore the wealth and variety of human experience. "Rationalism in politics," says Oakeshott, "involves a misconception with regard to the nature of human knowledge." History has shown that it produces unexpected, often disastrous results. "Having cut himself off from the traditional knowledge of his society, and denied the value of any education more extensive than a training in a technique of analysis," the Rationalist succeeds only in undermining the institutions that hold civilized society together. In this regard, rationalism in politics is "a corruption of the mind."

《政治思想史》是20世纪60年代晚期奥克肖特教授在伦敦政治经济学院授课的讲稿，是在他去世之后由几位学者编辑出版的。全书展示了奥克肖特对于西方民族的政治活动所进行的深入探究和分析，以及所得出的不同的独到而深邃的思考。《政治思想史》尽管是授课讲稿，但绝非是一部泛泛而谈的政治思想通史，无论是题材的选择，还是展开论述的视角，无不闪烁着奥克肖特那独特的智慧火花。作者对欧洲历代政治思想及其流派的精辟透彻的分析和独到深邃的见解，条分缕析，娓娓道来，让读者体会到一部经典著作也可以读得有趣而轻松！

Based on the author's seminal article in Foreign Affairs, Samuel P. Huntington's The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order is a provocative and prescient analysis of the state of world politics after the fall of communism. In this incisive work, the renowned political scientist explains how "civilizations" have replaced nations and ideologies as the driving force in global politics today and offers a brilliant analysis of the current climate and future possibilities of our world's volatile political culture.

That at London the hospitals are better and more desirable than those of Paris, for that in the best at Paris there die two out of fifteen, whereas at London there die out of the worst scarce 2 out of 16, and yet but a fiftieth part of the whole die out of the hospitals at London, and two-fifths, or twenty times that proportion die out of the Paris hospitals which are of the same kind; that is to say, the number of those at London, who choose to lie sick in hospitals rather than in their own houses, are to the like people of Paris as one to twenty; which shows the greater poverty or want of means in the people of Paris than those of London.

The definitive biography of Henry Kissinger, based on unprecedented access to his private papers
No American statesman has been as revered or as reviled as Henry Kissinger. Once hailed as “Super K”—the “indispensable man” whose advice has been sought by every president from Kennedy to Obama—he has also been hounded by conspiracy theorists, scouring his every “telcon” for evidence of Machiavellian malfeasance. Yet as Niall Ferguson shows in this magisterial two-volume biography, drawing not only on Kissinger’s hitherto closed private papers but also on documents from more than a hundred archives around the world, the idea of Kissinger as the ruthless arch-realist is based on a profound misunderstanding.
The first half of Kissinger’s life is usually skimmed over as a quintessential tale of American ascent: the Jewish refugee from Hitler’s Germany who made it to the White House. But in this first of two volumes, Ferguson shows that what Kissinger achieved before his appointment as Richard Nixon’s national security adviser was astonishing in its own right. Toiling as a teenager in a New York factory, he studied indefatigably at night. He was drafted into the U.S. infantry and saw action at the Battle of the Bulge—as well as the liberation of a concentration camp—but ended his army career interrogating Nazis. It was at Harvard that Kissinger found his vocation. Having immersed himself in the philosophy of Kant and the diplomacy of Metternich, he shot to celebrity by arguing for “limited nuclear war.” Nelson Rockefeller hired him. Kennedy called him to Camelot. Yet Kissinger’s rise was anything but irresistible. Dogged by press gaffes and disappointed by “Rocky,” Kissinger seemed stuck—until a trip to Vietnam changed everything.
The Idealist is the story of one of the most important strategic thinkers America has ever produced. It is also a political Bildungsroman, explaining how “Dr. Strangelove” ended up as consigliere to a politician he had always abhorred. Like Ferguson’s classic two-volume history of the House of Rothschild, Kissinger sheds dazzling new light on an entire era. The essential account of an extraordinary life, it recasts the Cold War world.

本书系英国兰开斯特大学历史系组织编写的“世界史丛书”中的一种。本丛书本着“一本书一个主题”的概念，分析介绍了欧洲乃至世界各个时期的运动和人物。《雅典的民主》主要以编年史的形式，通过资料分析介绍了雅典民主制度的形式、运作以及雅典政府发展的过程，同时还介绍了当时的显赫人物等。本书提供了有关“雅典的民主制度研究”最新研究成果，权威性的介绍，同时，还在书后列出了“参考文献”，对有志于进一步研究的人士颇有助益。

《社会契约论》是一部政治哲学著作。它探讨的是政治权利的原理，它的主旨是为人民民主主权的建立奠定理论基础。它的问世，是时代的需要，是人类社会向前进步的产物；它正确回答了历史进程提出的问题：法国命运的航船驶向何方。人类是幸运的，人民是伟大的，在历史发展的紧要关头，总有人指引前进的道路，人民总能及时做出正确的抉择。“在18世纪的法国政治思想领域里，存在着三种改革国家政治制度的学说：孟德斯鸠主张立宪君主制，伏尔泰主张开明的君主制，而卢梭主张民主共和制。

《论自由》是英国资产阶级哲学家、经济学家、自由主义的著名代表人物。书中论述资本主义制度下的公民自由权利，阐明“社会所能合法施用于个人的权力的性质和限度”，并提出了自由的各项“原则”。
关于“论自由”这本书，密尔在引论中开宗明义地说，他所要讨论的是“公民自由或社会自由，也就是要探讨社会所能合法施用于个人的权力的性质和限度”。全书要义可以概括为两条基本原则：一、个人的行为只要不涉及他人的利害，个人就有完全的行动自由，不必向社会负责；他人对于这个人的行为不得干涉，至多可以进行忠告、规劝或避而不理。二、只有当个人的行为危害到他人利益时，个人才应当接受社会的或法律的惩罚。社会只有在这个时候，才对个人的行为有裁判权，也才能对个人施加强制力量。

自由主义中的保守派只能接受形式上的平等，也就是法律面前人人平等的原则；而自由平等主义者则表现出对于实质平等的强烈关怀。罗尔斯在《正义论》当中提出了关于正义的两条原则：第一条是所谓平等的自由原则，即每个人应该在社会中享有平等的自由权利；第二条原则包括差别原则与机会平等原则。前者要求在进行分配的时候，如果不得不产生某种不平等的话，这种不平等应该有利于境遇最差的人们的最大利益，就是说，利益分配应该像处于不利地位的人们倾斜；后者要求将机会平等的原则应用于社会经济的不平等，使具有同等能力、技术与动机的人们享有平等的获得职位的机会。煌煌50万言的文字，便是围绕这两个原则展开的。

《论国家的作用》(精装)内容简介：严格地讲，有社会就有统治，有国家就有压迫。按照马克思主义的观点，国家的实质就是一个阶级对另一个阶级进行专政的工具。恩格斯指出：“国家无非是一个阶级镇压另一个阶级的机器。”社会的统治阶级只有依靠国家机器才能先例国家权力，在对整个社会进行领导和管理时，强迫被统治阶级服从自己的意志，人的自由和尊严也不能像洪堡那样建立在理念的空中楼阁上，而是与社会群体的具体情况息息相关。

《论人类不平等的起源和基础》为卢梭1753年应法国第戎科学院的征文而撰写的论文，出版于1755年。在书中，卢梭阐发了自身的政治哲学，为《社会契约论》的写作奠定了基础。不同于同时代哲学家的乐观认识，卢梭将人类历史的发展过程视作进步与退化的矛盾统一体。他一方面借助当时有关野蛮人的人类学材料，一方面展开辩证的想象，回顾了人类由自然状态向社会状态过渡的历史进程，指出人类的进步史同时也是人类的堕落史，因为人类每向前发展一步，不平等的程度即加深一步。而私有制的确立，是造成人类不平等及其后果的关键环节。
这个译本根据法国学者勒赛克尔的评注本译出，书中有大量解读性质的评注，书前有勒赛克尔撰写的《让-雅克·卢梭：生平与著作》一文，可帮助读者全面把握卢梭的生平与思想。

作者从自由主义的基本理论出发，讨论了著名思想家维柯、卢梭、费希特、黑格尔、圣西门、赫尔德和迈斯特等人对自由以及人类历史的看法。梳理了乌托邦、浪漫主义、法西斯土义到民族主义等思想的兴衰或变迁，阐释了在扭曲的社会意识形态之下扭曲的人性。
本书是“人文与社会译丛”之一，全书共分8个部分，主要讨论了著名思想家维柯、卢梭、费希特、黑格尔、圣西门、赫尔德和迈斯特等人对自由以及人类历史的看法。梳理了乌托邦、浪漫主义、法西斯土义到民族主义等思想的兴衰或变迁，阐释了在扭曲的社会意识形态之下扭曲的人性。该书可供各大专院校作为教材使用，也可供从事相关工作的人员作为参考用书使用。

全书分为三个部分：反犹主义、帝国主义、极权主义。作者从19世纪中欧与东欧历史中的反犹主义入手，追索其中的极权主义因素，然后审视欧洲的殖民帝国主义。在研究极权主义运动和政府的机构、组织和运作时，她集中分析了极权主义统治的两种形式——纳粹时期的德国和斯大林时期的苏联。在结论一章中，她出色地分析了人类的孤立和孤独是产生极权统治的先决条件。